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Abstract 
 
In the past two decades, Latin American countries reformed their pension 
systems focusing mainly on addressing the weaknesses of the contributory 
schemes - fiscal unsustainability, low coverage levels and a high degree of 
segmentation- and barely addressed the non-contributory element. The reform 
experiences show however that the intended reforms did not manage to meet 
their objectives. Firstly, to this day, a large proportion of the population remains 
inadequately covered by the contributory system. Secondly, the fiscal 
performance and outcome of the reform was worse than originally planned. The 
possibilities for the success of these reforms faced several constraints of a 
structural nature that are independent of the pension system itself and that as a 
result can not be overcome by a pension reform including mainly the limited 
savings capacity of some population groups and the instability and 
precariousness of the labor markets in the region. The Latin American experience 
shares similarities with that of China in terms of coverage, labor market 
informality. Both cases attest to the importance of combining contributory and 
non-contributory components in pension reform design. 
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Introduction 
 
The main function of a country’s pension system is to guarantee the adequate insurance 
of the population against old age poverty. To this end, pension systems generally combine a 
contributory scheme with a non-contributory component (a solidarity component) by which 
basic benefits are delivered to individuals who have reached old age and are unable to finance 
their basic expenses regardless of past contributions (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
Pension systems in Latin America have tended, however, to rely mainly on contributory 
schemes. Non-contributory programs have been sparse and of very limited scope and 
application. Non-contributory programs have been applied in a few countries but even so have 
lacked substantially in terms of coverage as they have been able to attend only a small fraction 
of the elderly. In addition, these have provided in general uncertain welfare protection since 
benefits have been known to be granted under an unclear set of rules and mostly through the 
discretionary power of the authorities (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
Since their inception, contributory pension schemes in Latin America were organized in 
the form of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) intergenerational contract systems. Over time the PAYGO 
systems faced insurmountable difficulties as these had become characterized by fiscal 
unsustainability, low coverage levels and a high degree of (inequitable) segmentation. As a 
result, Latin American countries were forced to reform their pension systems. The non-reform 
of the pension system was not an available option.  
 
To this end, –starting with Chile in the 1980’s and continuing with several other 
countries in the 1990’s- Latin American countries undertook structural pension reforms focused 
mainly on addressing the weaknesses of the contributory schemes and barely addressing the 
non-contributory element. These reforms replaced or combined the existing PAYGO systems 
with fully funded models of individual capitalization.  
 
The underlying rationale for this particular mode of reform was that by establishing a 
fully funded component of individual capitalization, the tighter linkage between the 
contributions made and the pension received would reduce (in the long term) the fiscal 
requirements stemming from the reformed system by shifting the economic and financial risks 
of pension provision –totally or in part- from the State to the workers themselves. At the same 
time, the close linkage between contributions and benefits would reduce the “tax connotation” 
of the pension-fund contributions paid by affiliates and in that way provide an incentive for the 
formalization of the labor force and the expansion of contributory coverage (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
The pension reform experience of the Latin American countries in the past two decades 
shows however that the intended reforms did not manage to meet their objectives. Firstly, to this 
day, a large proportion of the population remains inadequately covered by the contributory 
system. Secondly, the fiscal performance and outcome of the reform was worse than originally 
planned.  
 
In spite of the closer correlation between contributions and benefits in countries that 
have undertaken structural reforms, no significant or systematic increases in pension coverage 
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rates can be observed. In fact, the ratio between the number of workers actually making 
contributions in a given period and the economically active population (EAP) of the economy 
does not exhibit a clear trend after the reforms. While in some countries coverage expanded in 
others it decreased even further. Moreover the evidence shows that existing contributory social 
protection systems cover only a fraction of male and female workers with the situation being 
more complex in rural areas and among workers in the informal sector. Finally, the inequalities 
in coverage -that had been a pervasive element of pension systems in Latin America since their 
inception- remained unchanged after the reforms. 
 
On the fiscal front, the analysis shows that the transition costs of the pension reform are 
by no means negligible and in fact can represent, in the cases analyzed in this paper, up to 1.5% 
of GDP. Transition costs can also be protracted over time. Furthermore, governments have had 
to rely on non-contributory fiscal expenditures and subsidies to partially compensate for the 
failure of the reforms to substantially expand their coverage, thereby increasing the fiscal 
burden of the reform. 
 
The possibilities for the success of these reforms faced several constraints of a structural 
nature that are independent of the pension system itself and that as a result can not be overcome 
by a pension reform. These constraints include mainly the limited savings capacity of some 
population groups and the instability and precariousness of the labor markets in the region 
(ECLAC, 2006). 
 
As a result, given the unlikely alteration in these structural characteristics, the prospects 
for a reversal in the coverage situation of the pension system in the short to medium term are not 
encouraging.  It is therefore urgent to work towards the development of social protection 
systems that are not uniquely employment-based. In addition to seeking ways to build the 
capacity of national economies for creating decent work, progress must be made in adopting 
measures to guarantee adequate and stable financing in order to supplement employment-based 
protection with non-contributory solidarity based mechanisms (ECLAC, 2006). 
 
The Latin American experience and history in pension reform is not unique to the 
region. Countries of other regions of the developing world, affected by the same problems and 
prompted by the same concerns (fiscal unsustainability and low coverage) as those pertaining to 
Latin America, have opted to undertake a similar path in pension reform. Such is the case of 
China, which following several unsuccessful attempts, replaced its PAYGO system in 1997, 
with a mixed pension system.  In spite of more than one decade since the reform was 
implemented, many of the problems that plagued the PAYGO system remain unresolved.  
  
The analysis of the pension reform outcomes in Latin America in terms of coverage, 
fiscal performance can provide useful insights for the Chinese case since both cases share 
important similarities.  
 
For one thing, as with Latin America, the existence of structural constraints in China, 
such as its high degree of labor market informality, represent a significant obstacle to the 
success of the pension reform in terms of coverage. In both cases, the formalization of the labor 
market is a prerequisite for pension reform success. In the case of China, labor market 
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precariousness is magnified by the sheer size of its rural population and the growing migration 
flows from rural to urban areas. 
 
Also, both cases point to the importance of combining in pension reform design market 
incentives, through a contributory component, with a strong and operational solidarity 
component (non-contributory component) clearly defined, and delimited.  
  
This paper analyses the pension system reforms implemented by Latin American 
countries with a view to assess the outcomes in terms of fiscal performance and of contributory 
coverage.  The paper also builds on the Latin American experiences analyzed, to draw general 
implications that may be of use when analyzing the Chinese current experience with pension 
reform.  
 
The paper is divided into six sections. The first and second sections provide a description 
of the motives and strategies for pension reforms in Latin America. The third section analyses 
the outcomes of the reforms in terms of the fiscal requirements of the pension system during and 
after the reform. The fourth section examines the outcomes of reforms in terms of (quality) 
contributory coverage. The fifth section centers on the lessons of the Latin American 
experiences for the Chinese case. The final reflections are found in the conclusion.  
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1. Motivation and strategies of pension reform in Latin America 
 
1.1. Motivation for reforms 
 
At the time of the reform initiatives, which started with Chile in the 1980’s and 
intensified in the 1990’s with many other countries, pension systems in Latin America were 
experiencing serious difficulties both at the non-contributory and contributory levels.2 Non-
contributory programs were very limited, existing only in a few countries. Even in these 
countries the benefits were sometimes granted with unclear rules responding to discretional 
initiatives. Furthermore, they covered a small proportion of the elderly and in general provided 
limited and uncertain welfare protection (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
Pension systems were thus relying mainly on the contributory schemes, traditionally 
organized in the form of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) intergenerational contract systems- These 
contributory PAYGO pension schemes had become characterized by fiscal unsustainability, low 
coverage levels and a high degree of (inequitable) segmentation. Structural pension reforms 
focused mainly on addressing these weaknesses of the contributory schemes and barely 
addressed the non-contributory element.  
 
1.2. Fiscal unsustainability 
 
PAYGO systems in various Latin American countries were facing severe disequilibria 
both in terms of their current balances as in terms of their long run sustainability which put a lot 
of pressure on fiscal budget and deficit. 
 
Contribution revenue had been decreasing as a result of rising dependency ratios and 
increased evasion together with macroeconomic crises which caused a rise in unemployment 
and the informalisation of part of the labor force.  
 
At the same time, pension expenditures had been growing rapidly as a result of larger 
numbers of pensioners -in line with population ageing- together with repeated benefit increases. 
As a result contribution revenue had become insufficient to cover current benefit expenditures 
and pension systems exhibited increasing deficits.  
 
The fiscal situation was projected to worsen in the long-term as population ageing would 
put even further pressures on the systems’ balances. In all the Latin American countries that 
undertook structural reforms, the present value of the stream of benefits to be paid by the 
PAYGO system to contributors, beneficiaries, and their survivors (generally called the Implicit 
Pension Debt) was projected to increase monotonically across time, in line with the systems’ 
maturity and population ageing.   
                                                 
2
 Non-contributory programs are a solidarity element of the pension system consisting in providing benefits to the 
elderly in need regardless of past contributions history. 
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For example, Implicit Public Debt levels projected for 2050 by Zviniene and Packard (2004) 
were at 211% without reform for Chile, 121% without reform for Argentina and 313% without 
reform for Uruguay.  
 
1.3. Low coverage levels 
 
More than half of pension system structural reformers exhibited unsatisfactory coverage 
levels of their PAYGO schemes. Only four out of eleven reforming countries, Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay, reached contributory coverage ratios equal to or above 50% of their 
labor force in the pre-reform years. A second group of countries including Colombia, Mexico, 
Dominican Republic and Peru reached contributory coverage levels comprised between 30% 
and 40% of the labor force. Finally, the group of poorer countries among pension reformers – 
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua-, exhibited contributory coverage levels ranging 
between 10% and 20% of the labor force (Mesa-Lago, 2002a; Mesa-Lago, 2004a). 
 
Although the causes behind this low coverage levels for the majority of Latin America 
pension reformers responded to structural problems of the labor market together with low 
savings capacity of the population, the reform was based on the logic that the causes were 
basically lack of positive incentives to contribute and limited trust in the public system. 
Specifically, one set of hypothesis argued that PAYGO systems established weak linkages 
between contributions and retirement benefits. This led agents to perceive social security 
contributions as a tax on income and, as a result, provided a disincentive to contribute. Another 
type of explanation hypothesized that the main issue was not the perception of social security 
contributions as a tax on income, but rather the perception that the benefits were not sufficient to 
‘induce workers to contribute to the pension system.  
 
With this logic in mind, the assumption behind the reforms was that a tighter link 
between benefits and contributions -brought about by the introduction of a defined contribution 
component through individual accounts- would affect positively the incentives of workers to 
contribute (Arza, 2008). This, together with greater transparency and efficiency of the system, 
would bring about the “formalization” of the labor force and thus raise contributory coverage.  
 
 
1.4. High degree of (inequitable) fragmentation 
 
In general pension systems tended to be highly fragmented; multiple schemes existed at the 
same time with very different conditions for participation and benefits. Besides, systems were in 
many cases subject to abuse by political groups since benefits were decided by lobbying and 
political power, leaving vast groups of population in a disadvantaged position or even excluded 
from the system (Queisser, 1998). 
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2. Strategies of reform 
 
In view of the above shortcomings of traditional PAYGO schemes, since the 1980’s several 
of the region’s countries made structural reforms totally or partially replacing them with systems 
containing a fully funded component of individually capitalized accounts.  
 
The reforms introduced can be classified in three broad types: (i) the substitutive type, where 
a PAYGO regime is totally replaced by a fully funded system of individually capitalized 
accounts; (ii) those that entail the introduction of parallel regimes which maintain the PAYGO 
component, but also incorporate a fully-funded individual-account component as an alternative; 
(iii) those that establish mixed models that include an individual-account component as a 
complement to the PAYGO regime (ECLAC, 2006). Table 1 shows the eleven structural 
reforming countries according to the type of model introduced by the reforms. 
 
Table 1: Structural Reforms in Latin American Countries 
 
Reform model, country and starting date 
 
 
Financial regime 
 
Benefits calculation 
Fully funded substitutive model  
Chile: May 1981 
Bolivia: May 1997 
Mexico: September 1997 
El Salvador: May 1998 
Dominican Republic: 2003-2005 
Individually capitalized 
accounts Defined contribution 
  
   
Fully funded parallel model  
(workers can choose the system of their preference) PAYGO Defined benefit 
Peru: June 1993 
Colombia: April 1994 
Individually capitalized 
accounts Defined contribution 
   
Fully funded mixed model   
(workers pay into both systems simultaneously) 
Argentina: July 1994 
Uruguay: April 1996 
PAYGO Defined benefit 
Costa Rica: May 2001 
Ecuador: 2001 
 
Individually capitalized 
accounts Defined contribution 
Source: ECLAC (2006); Mesa-Lago (2004a) 
 
 
In these three types of reformed systems, benefits paid by the individual account 
components are not defined. Rather, they depend directly on the actuarial result of capitalizing 
individual contributions on financial markets. They are therefore a function of the worker’s 
lifetime earnings, contribution history and investment decisions made by the administrators of 
such accounts (ECLAC, 2006; Arenas de Mesa et al., 2006).  
 
This stronger link between the contributions made by each individual and the pensions 
paid to him/her was intended to (i) counteract the long-term financial sustainability problems of 
traditional PAYGO models by shifting the economic and financial risks of pension provision –
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totally or in part- from the State to the workers themselves and (ii) reduce the “tax connotation” 
of the pension-fund contributions paid by affiliates and in that way provide an incentive for the 
formalization of the labor force and the expansion of contributory coverage (ECLAC, 2006). 
 
 
3. Fiscal requirements of the pension system during and after the reform 
 
The structural reform of a pension system from a PAYGO regime to a system containing 
individually capitalized accounts entails transition costs. The transition costs are expected to 
decline over time and disappear, once the transition phase from one system to the next is 
complete. However as experiences show, transition phases can be long and protracted. 
Depending on the demographic characteristics of the country and the specificities regarding the 
pension system, transition phases can last from 40 to 60 years (Mesa-Lago, 2002b). 
 
Also, other fiscal requirements stemming from the operation requirements of the pension 
system will be present not only during but also after the completion of the transition phase. 
These include: 
 
 Non-contributory assistance pensions (pillar zero) to poor non-insured workers.3  
 Subsidies to top-up contributory pillar pensions (generally called Minimum 
Pension Guarantees).  
 Subsidies to independent “special” pension schemes in cases where some of these 
where not consolidated by the reform and/or subsidies to the PAYGO public pillar 
remaining in place (in cases of mixed or parallel type reforms). 
  
 
3.1 Transition cost 
 
A structural reform that implies a change in the financial regime of the contributory 
pension system from an intergenerational contract pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system –where 
active workers finance current pensions- to individual capitalization–where each person’s 
pension is financed by his/her own savings in an individual account- may imply incurring costs 
of transition which, as shown by some country experiences analyzed below, are high and long 
lasting.   
 
These transition costs are usually divided in two basic parts: (i) the operating deficit of 
the public PAYGO system and (ii) the recognition of past contributions into the old system 
made by workers who move to the new system (often called "recognition bond") (ECLAC, 
2006; Mesa Lago, 2002a). 
  
                                                 
3
 The expenditure on assistance pensions is not actually a consequence of the reforms but rather it exists 
independently of the latter, in the old and new systems.    
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Table 2: Fiscal Requirements of the pension system during and after reform 
 
Country Chile Argentina Costa Rica
Type of Reform
Year 1980 1993 2000
Treatment given to individuals "Old men" stay in the PAYGO system "Old men" stay in PAYGO system "Old men" stay in PAYGO system
"New men" compulsorily to IA system 
Fiscal Requirements
    Transition Cost
         (I)  Operating deficit of PAYGO
        (II)   Recognition of past contributions to old PAYGO
    Minimum Pension Guarantees
    Assistance Pensions 
    Subsidies to independent “special”  pension schemes
    not consolidated by the reform (if needed)
Source: Own elaboration using AIOS; Mesa Lago (2002b); Mesa Lago (2004) and ILO (2005).
Yes, assistance pensions are in place for poor 
individuals not covered by the contributory 
system. 
"New men" can choose between mixed system or 
reformed PAYGO system 
"New men" compulsorily to mixed system 
"Middle men" given short time to choose 
between swithching to IA system or stay in  
PAYGO
Yes, the PAYGO system looses contributions of 
those that choose IA option for second pillar. It still 
has to pay pensions to "old men", first pillar benefits 
to all retirees in mixed system, and second pillar 
benefits to workers those that choose PAYGO 
option for their second pillar.  
Yes, but only to individuals fulffiling retirement 
conditions (i.e 30 years of contributions in total). 
Value of contributions made is recognized through 
the Compensatory Benefit ("Prestación 
Compensatoria"). It is adjustable but has a ceiling, 
and earns no interest.
No,
 the public system does not loose part of its 
contributions because the IA are funded by 
contributions diverted from other purposes and 
NOT from the public system. 
No, because the public pillar remains open and 
pays a pension under the same conditions that 
before the reform
"Middle men" compulsorily to mixed system "Middle men" can choose between mixed system or 
reformed PAYGO system 
Substitutive                                                   
PAYGO system is closed to new affiliates. It is 
substituted by fully funded model of Individually 
Capitalized Accounts (IA). 
Mixed                                                           
combines a reformed public PAYGO first pillar with 
a second pillar that offers workers the choice 
between: a PAYGO scheme paying a defined 
benefit or a fully funded individually capitalized 
account (IA).
Mixed                                                                
combines a public PCF first pillar with a second 
pillar of fully funded individually capitalized 
accountS (IA).
Yes, assistance pensions ("PASIS") are in place 
for indigent elderly not covered by the 
contributory system. But Government limited the 
amount of PASIS given out in order to control 
fiscal costs and therefore many people did not 
receive this coverage although qualifying for it. 
Yes, the PAYGO system looses most of its 
revenues because contributions are diverted to 
the IA's and still has to pay its obligations with 
old men and middle men that chose not to 
switch.
Yes, to all "middle men" that switch to IA 
system. Value of contributions made is 
recognized through public debt instruments 
("Recognition Bonds)" . They have no ceiling, 
are adjustable to inflation and earn 4% real 
interest annualy.
Yes, for example for example the Judiciary 
Power and Teachers pension schemes was not 
consolidated by the reform. 
The minimum pension is given by the one paid by 
the first public PAYGO pillar (the Basic Universal 
Benefit or "Prestación Básica Universal") to those 
complying with the required 30 years of 
contributions. The Government does not guarantee 
a minimum pension in the IA pillar. 
The minimum pension is given by the one paid 
by the first public pillar to those complying with 
the required 25 years of contributions. The 
Government does not guarantee a minimum 
pension in the IA pillar. 
Yes,
 the Government gives MPG's to all those 
affiliates of IA system that do not accumulate 
enough funds to retire with a pension higher than 
the statutory minimum (provided they comply 
with required minimum years of contributions)
Yes, for example the armed forces' pension 
scheme was not consolidated by the reform 
Yes, assistance pensions are in place for poor 
individuals who are not covered by the contributory 
system and not receiving any other type of pension. 
Yes, for example the armed forces' pension scheme 
was not consolidated by the reform. Pension 
schemes of some provinces (together with their 
deficits) have been transferred to the national 
system. 
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3.1.1. Operating deficit 
  
The operating deficit of the public system occurs because, after the reform, the public 
PAYGO pillar is left without contributors or with a minority of them, but with the burden of all 
current pensions plus those that will be eventually granted to the insured that chose to stay in the 
old system (Mesa-Lago, 2002a).  
 
The degree to which the PAYGO regime is replaced by the individual capitalization 
component is the key determinant of the changes in contribution revenue received by the public 
system and therefore of the size of the operating deficit that this one will incur.  
 
In the extreme case of a substitutive reform, in which the PAYGO scheme is closed to 
new affiliates and a majority of the existing affiliates move (generally voluntarily) to the funded 
scheme, the transition immediately generates the loss of a majority of contribution revenue for 
the public system. This, together with payments of pensions that must continue, gives rise to an 
immediate increase in the operating deficit (an example of this is Chile as it will be discussed 
below).  
 
In the less extreme where the new system is mixed -and therefore includes a compulsory 
PAYGO first pillar- part of the contributions may also be diverted to the funded pillar, but a 
certain amount of them will still be going towards the public system (ECLAC, 2006). In this 
case the operating deficit need not be as large as in the substitutive case (an example discussed 
below is that of Argentina). It may even be the case that new contributions are put in place to 
fund the individual accounts in the mixed system so that none at all have to be diverted away 
from the public first pillar. In this case, the public pillar will experience no change in its 
contribution revenues as a consequence of the reform (an example of this is Costa Rica). 
 
3.1.2 Recognition of past contributions  
 
A key institutional design issue of the reforms from an intergeneration contract 
(PAYGO) to a system containing individual accounts is to determine what will be the 
Government’s obligations towards current workers who have accrued benefits under the old 
PAYGO system and decide to switch to the new system.  
 
If the reform is substitutive and completely eliminates the PAYGO pillar, workers that 
change to the new system should be recognized in some way for the contributions already made 
to the system that ceased to exist, but the generosity of this recognition is the issue that has to be 
decided. In this sense countries face a trade-off because a less generous recognition (capped, not 
adjusted, no interest earned, previous contributions required) in order to reduce fiscal costs goes in 
detriment to the general welfare of the insured (Mesa- Lago, 2002b). An example of this trade-off is 
given by Chile whose reform was the most generous of all, -the Government recognized the whole 
value of contributions with no upper ceiling, adjusted them for inflation and paid an interest on 
the value-  but also the most onerous from a fiscal standpoint (Mesa-Lago, 2002b).  Other reforming 
countries opted for less generous and less expensive options  (to recognize contributions only to 
some workers complying with a minimum number of contributions, not adjust the contribution 
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value for inflation, not to pay interest). In Mexico for example, the reform only recognized the 
years of contributions but not the value of contributions made. 4 
 
If the system emerging after the reform is mixed and maintains a public PAYGO pillar, 
working basically with the same conditions as before the reforms, countries need not  make an 
explicit recognition of contributions because individuals will end up receiving a pension from 
that pillar anyway. An example of the latter is the Costa Rican mixed reform.5  
 
Lastly, if the new system is mixed but the new PAYGO pillar works with benefits and 
conditions completely different to the ones prevailing before the reform countries may choose to 
recognize explicitly rights accrued by individuals in the old PAYGO (an example is Argentina). 
 
Next we examine the experience with transition costs of three Latin American countries 
that underwent structural reforms in the direction of substituting (Chile) or complementing 
(Argentina, Costa Rica) their public PAYGO systems with individually capitalized fully funded 
components. The analysis will offer some insights of how the above factors affected the 
transition costs.  
 
3.1.3 The extreme case of Chile: the largest transition costs 
 
In 1980, Chile implemented a substitutive reform of its pension system through which 
the existing public PAYGO system was closed to new affiliates and replaced by a private, 
defined contributions, fully funded system of individually capitalized accounts. Individuals 
already retired as of the reform date (“old men”) continued to receive their pension form the 
PAYGO regime but individuals entering the work force after the reform date (“new men”) had 
to compulsorily enroll in the new system. 
 
On the other hand, individuals already working as of the reform date (“middle men”) had 
the choice of remaining in the old PAYG system or switching to the new individual account 
system. A majority of them chose to switch because they were given incentives to do so; their 
contribution rates were set much lower in the new system, and the Government made a 
compromise to recognize the value of their past contributions to the PAYGO system (Uthoff, 
2001).  
 
The reform brought about a large immediate increase in the operating deficit of the 
public PAYGO system that saw its contributions almost completely diverted to the individual 
accounts and still had to pay pensions to all the “old men” and to the few “middle men” who 
                                                 
4
 Instead, in Mexico all workers who changed to the new system were given the option of a “life time switch” this 
is, to choose at retirement between a pension calculated according to the rules of the old system and a pension from 
their individual account balance (Queisser, 1998;  Mesa-Lago, 2000). 
5
 If the conditions of the post-reform PAYGO are stricter and/or its benefits lower, countries have in general 
generated an age division of  workers in such a way that the reform does not apply (or applies gradually) to older 
generations of workers and no abrupt decrease in benefits occurs to them. Older generations of workers are the most 
affected by the reforms; they have already made many years of contributions to the old more generous system and if the new 
system and rules were applied to them they would have lower first pillar benefits and not enough years left to generate a benefit 
equivalent to this loss in the second pillar. 
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chose to stay in that system. The operating deficit was the main factor explaining the transition 
cost throughout the whole period; it increased from 1.8% of GDP in 1980, before the reform, to 
a peak of  4.7% of GDP in 1984 and only then started to decline. It is projected to stand at 1.5% 
of GDP by 2010 (Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para la Reforma Previsional, 
2006). Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that the increase in the operating deficit of the 
system was not only a consequence of the reform but of other factors that affected it at the same 
time. In particular, immediately after the reform the decrease in revenues of the public system 
was accentuated by the economic crisis of the beginning of the 1980’s which caused a decrease 
in real wages and an increase in unemployment. Early estimates indicate that only 20% of the 
operating deficit during the first years after the reform was caused exclusively by the loss of 
contributory revenue diverted into individual accounts.6 
 
In terms of the second component of the transition cost, the recognition of accrued 
benefits under the old PAYGO system, the Government decided to recognize the value of all 
past contributions made to the old system by “middle men” who switched to the new one. This 
was done by transforming them into public-debt instruments (the “Recognition Bonds”) that 
mature upon retirement of the worker. It is at this moment that the sum is deposited in his 
individual account.7 The expenditure on such bonds is therefore deferred in time in line with 
“middle men” retirements (ECLAC, 2006). It started at levels of 0.1% of GDP in 1982 and has 
been increasing steadily since then reaching 1.3% of GDP in 2004 (Informe de Diagnóstico 
para el Consejo Asesor para la Reforma Previsional, 2006). 
 
 
3.1.4 The other extreme: no transition costs in Costa Rica 
 
In 2000 Costa Rica reformed its pension system into a mixed model that combined the 
existing public pillar (functioning under Partial Collective Funding) with a fully funded 
compulsory second pillar through individually capitalized accounts.8  The new mixed system 
was made compulsory for all “new men” and “middle men”.  The reform did not bring about an 
operating deficit of the public pillar because this one did not lose contributory revenue. The 
contributions to fund the individual accounts were not diverted from it but instead represented a 
reallocation of employer contributions that were originally assigned to other purposes.9  
                                                 
6
 These estimates are found in Larrain and Vergara (2000)  are based on earlier figures for the operational deficit 
which do not coincide with the ones used here.  
7
 These bonds are inflation indexed and earn a fixed interest of 4% per annum. 
8
 In contrast to most Latin American pension systems, the existing public pension system in Costa Rica was, instead 
of a purely PAYGO system, a partially funded defined benefit system working under what is known as Partial 
Collective Funding (PCF) (Martinez Franzoni, 2008). This is the system that remained in place as the first pillar 
after the structural reform. In the PCF (Partial Collective Funding) a fund is created with part of the contributions 
received by the public pillar and it is invested so that interest earnings from it together with future contributions are 
used to fund the pensions of a certain period. Periodically it is evaluated whether the funds accumulated and the 
interest earnings are enough to pay obligations and if not, the contribution rates of the system are adjusted.  
9
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In Costa Rica, there was no recognition of past contributions to the PAYGO pillar because this 
one remained open and paying first pillar benefits to all retirees under basically the same 
conditions as prior to the reform.10 Therefore in Costa Rica transition costs did not exist as such. 
 
 
3.1.5. An intermediate case: Argentina 
 
In 1993 Argentina reformed its pension system from a PAYGO system to a mixed one 
that was compulsory to all “middle men” and “new men”. The new mixed system combines a 
reformed public PAYGO first pillar with a second pillar that offers workers the choice between: 
a PAYGO scheme paying a defined benefit or a fully funded individually capitalized account.  
The revenues of the public PAYGO system were reduced in a magnitude corresponding to the 
contributions of all the workers that choose the individual account option for their second pillar. 
An increase in the operating deficit of the public system arises as a consequence of these lower 
revenues and this is a first part of the transition cost of the mixed reform.  
 
But here, as in the Chilean case, there is a second part arising from recognition of 
contributions made to the pre-reform PAYGO system. This is because in the Argentine case, the 
reformed PAYGO system does not pay benefits under the same conditions as before the reform. 
Instead, it pays a flat first pillar benefit equivalent to around 28% of the economy’s average 
wage at the time of the reform) to all workers and second pillar benefits only to those who chose 
the PAYGO option.11 Therefore as the new PAYGO system was conceived so differently to the 
old one, the government implemented a transitional compensatory benefit in order to 
compensate “middle men” for their rights accrued in the pre-reform PAYGO system. The 
objective was to maintain their benefits similar to what they would have been under the pre-
reform rules.12  This compensatory benefit is paid in the form of a monthly pension to all 
“middle men” upon their retirement. By choosing this type of payment instead of redeeming the 
whole recognition bond at the moment of retirement the cost is stretched out over a longer 
period in time. 
  
With the reform in place, the deficit of the public pension system rose from 1.8% of 
GDP in 1993 to a maximum of 3.5% in 2001. Then it started to decrease standing at 1.6% in 
2006.13  Nevertheless, as in the case of Chile, the increase in the deficit in the Argentine case 
cannot all be associated with the effect of the pension reform. Other factors have been strongly 
influencing the expenditure and revenue of the system and it is not obvious how to isolate their 
                                                 
10
 In 2005, the public system was parametrically reformed and stricter conditions and benefits were put in place. 
Nevertheless, these new conditions did not apply –or applied very modestly- for the older generations of “middle 
men”, the ones that had a larger number of contributions already made to the old more generous system. 
11
 The uniform benefit for all workers whatever their wage is paid provided they satisfy the required minimum 
conditions and it implies an important redistributive element. Nowadays the benefit is much lower than the original 
28% since in the year following the reform its calculation underwent changes and it was not adjusted for inflation.  
12
 The compensatory benefit is equivalent to 1.5% of base salary for every year contributed to the old PAYGO 
system so for example, a median wager “middle man” that at the time of the reform had already contributed 30 
years to the old PAYGO, will have a replacement rate starting at 73% from the new mixed system (28% from the 
flat benefit and 45% from the compensatory benefit), a level very similar to the one he would have gotten without 
the reform. 
13
 The deficit considered here is the “pure” deficit, i.e. the one that considers expenditures only in benefit payments 
and revenues only from contributions (excluding earmarked tax revenue). 
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effect (Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2004). In the first place, the system’s revenues decreased 
strongly as a result of reductions in contribution rates beginning in the mid nineties. This “fiscal 
devaluation” was part of a policy to enhance the competitiveness of the economy (ECLAC, 
2006). In the second place, beginning at about the same time, there was a gradual transfer of 
most of the provincial pension funds (along with their deficits) to the central government 
(Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2004; ECLAC, 2006).  Estimates by Cetrángolo and Grushka (2004), 
indicate that less than half of the pension deficit as of 2000 -which stood at 3.3% of GDP- can 
actually be explained by the loss of contributions diverted to the individual accounts.14  
 
Leaving aside the case of Costa Rica, which is an atypical case due to the absence of 
transition costs, the experiences of Chile and Argentina, which are representative of that of 
Latin America in general, show that transition costs are high and long lasting. In these cases, 
available estimates show that transition costs can come up to represent up to 1.5% of GDP.  
 
This highlights the importance of estimating the magnitude and possible duration of the 
transition costs that will be experienced and planning ahead how to finance them. Large and 
long lasting fiscal deficits induced by the pension reform may in fact generate a perverse cycle 
of increased credit risk perception and explosive debt dynamics as markets may react negatively 
to them (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2005). 
 
In the case of Chile, the option taken by the authorities was to deliberately strengthen the 
fiscal stance before undertaking the reform so that the transition costs could be more easily absorbed 
in the short-term. Fiscal surpluses of around 5% in the two years prior to the reform, nevertheless, 
came at the expense of cuts in public expenditure on other very relevant social areas. Argentina, by 
contrast, did not strengthen its fiscal situation previously to the reform and the large fiscal deficits it 
endured during the years following it are normally cited as an important factor contributing to the 
economic collapse of the late 2001 (Gill, Packard and Yermo 2005 and ECLAC, 2006). 
 
 
3.1.6 Other fiscal requirements 
 
As it was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the fiscal requirements of the 
pension system entail, besides transition costs due to the reform, other fiscal requirements that 
may persist even after the transition phase is over. These include expenditure on non-
contributory assistance pensions and minimum pension guarantees, subsidies to independent 
“special” pension schemes and/or to the PAYGO public pillar remaining in place (in cases of 
mixed or parallel type reforms).  
  
3.1.6.1. Non-contributory assistance pensions 
 
The decrease of public expenditure on non-contributory pensions after a structural 
reform depends critically on the success of expanding coverage levels of the contributory 
scheme. If this is not achieved, expenditure on non-contributory pensions need not decrease and 
                                                 
14
 Estimates by Rofman (2004) coincide with this magnitude; he estimates the loss of revenues of the public system 
as a consequence of the reform at 1.5% of GDP in 2000. In relation to expenditures on compensatory benefits, this 
part of the transition cost cannot be isolated from the overall balance of the public system due to lack of 
information.  
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it may even be the case that after reforms, more (rather than less) individuals have to resort to 
the non-contributory pillar. This could happen if –as it was the case in some Latin American 
experiences- parametric reforms accompanying the structural reforms turn the conditions of the 
contributory pillar too strict and some of the elderly who would have received a contributory 
pension under the previous rules end up with no pension under the new conditions (Ferreira 
Coimbra and Forteza, 2005).  
 
In Chile, expenditure on the “assistance pensions” (PASIS) for indigent elderly who did 
not qualify for a contributory pension was projected at 0.44% of GDP in 2010 up from 0.20% in 
1981 (Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para la Reforma Previsional, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as the Government limited the amount given out in order to control fiscal costs 
this may indeed underestimate the true value of what the level of assistance pensions would be 
in the absence of such restrictions.  
 
In Argentina, expenditure on non-contributory pensions increased from 0.16% of GDP 
in 1994 to 0.28% of GDP in 2006 (ILO, 2005; Cuenta de Inversión, Contaduría General de la 
Nación Argentina). In this case it is argued that the new stricter requisites for acquiring a 
pension after the parametric reform implied a decrease in coverage of the contributory system 
and, hand in hand with it, pressures on the non-contributory system (Cetrángolo and Grushka 
2008). Lastly, in Costa Rica, expenditure on non-contributory pensions stood at 0.4% of GDP in 
2006, up from 0.3% of GDP in 2000, the year of the reform.  
 
3.1.6.2. Minimum Pension Guarantees 
 
Minimum pension guarantees (MPG’s) are in place only in some countries and they 
consist of State subsidies to “top-up” contributory pensions of all those insured in the new 
system whose accumulated sum in the individual account is insufficient to finance at least a 
pension equal to a statutory minimum –provided they comply with required minimum years of 
contributions-.  
 
The expenditure on minimum pension guarantees can become quite relevant after the 
reforms if an important proportion of the population that was believed to be adequately covered 
by the contributory scheme ends up requiring these “top ups”.  
 
In Chile, where MPG’s existed provided the worker complies with a required minimum 
of 20 years of contributions, the expenditure on these guarantees increased from 0.01% of GDP 
in 1989 to 0.07% of GDP in 2004.(Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para la 
Reforma Previsional, 2006). Estimates indicated that as the system matured, more than 30 % of 
retirees would seek recourse to the minimum pension guarantee, resulting in a fiscal burden of 
about 1% of GDP (Asher and Vasudevan, 2008).  
In Argentina, the same as in Costa Rica, because the system is mixed all retirees from the 
contributory system receive at least the defined benefit paid by the PAYGO first pillar so in 
practice this constitutes the minimum pension. There exists no formal minimum pension 
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guarantee from the State for the individual account pillar.15 Nevertheless in the Argentine case, 
the Government recently had to incur relevant costs in order to provide a “bail out” to affiliates 
with insufficient funds accumulated in their individual accounts, just as if such a guarantee had 
been in place. This will be further discussed in section 3.3.1.  
 
By supposedly inducing the formalization of the labor market and increasing 
contributory coverage, the Latin American structural reforms were intended to make the non-
contributory pillar less relevant. Nevertheless this was not the case and the budgetary pressures 
arising from the transition costs were compounded by increasing demands for fiscal funding 
arising from the need to extend pension coverage through non-contributory means, both 
assistance pensions and minimum pension guarantees (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
 
3.1.6.3. Subsidies to independent pension schemes and/or to the public PAYGO 
 
In cases where some independent or “special” pension schemes remained outside the 
consolidation brought about by the reforms there may be substantial fiscal demands arising from 
them. This is generally the case because these schemes tend to suffer from the same mismatches 
between contribution revenues and benefit payments as the pre-reform PAYGO systems.  
In general countries have been successful to some extent in consolidating various schemes 
which were working under very different contribution and benefit conditions into a more unified 
system. As an example, in Costa Rica, there were 19 “special” regimes financed by the fiscal 
budget. Previous to the 2000 structural reform, 17 of them had already been consolidated 
leaving outside only the Judiciary Power and the National Teachers pension schemes. In Chile 
although most of the multiple schemes were consolidated, one that was left outside the reform, -
the one for the Armed Forces- runs a deficit that adds 1.3% of GDP yearly to the fiscal budget.16   
 
 
3.1.6.4. Subsidies to the remaining public PAYGO pillar in mature post reforms systems 
(in case of mixed or parallel reforms) 
 
In the case of mixed or parallel type reforms -where a public PAYGO scheme remains in 
place as the first pillar of the new post-transition system- fiscal requirements may stem from the 
need to subsidize the latter if continues to run financial imbalances even after the transition 
phase is over. 
 
If no adjustments are made to the parameters of the PAYGO system, or if the 
adjustments made are not sufficient to match up ongoing benefits with contributions such as to 
guarantee its sustainability in the long run, then these imbalances will be growing across time 
and putting ever tighter pressures on the fiscal budget.  
                                                 
15
 In Argentina the Government does guarantee a minimum return from the investments of an Individual Account 
administrator only if this return is below the system’s average and the reserves of the administrator are not enough 
to cover the difference (Mesa-Lago, 2000). 
16
 This figure corresponds to the year 2004 (Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para la Reforma 
Previsional, 2006). 
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In the Latin American experiences -independently of the type of the structural reform 
implemented- this one was accompanied by parametric changes to the public pillar in an attempt 
to establish the sustainability of the latter in the new models. This was so even in the case of 
Costa Rica, where the public PCF first pillar was exhibiting a current surplus but where 
sustainability projections showed that this one would turn into a deficit in the medium term (see 
Box 1).  
 
The parametric changes implemented generally involved those intended to adjust the 
conditions for retirement to the new demographic reality by increasing the legal retirement age 
and/or demanding longer contribution periods. Other changes were aimed at increasing the 
revenues of the PAYGO pillar and/or limiting the generosity of the benefits granted by it. This 
was done either directly –with increases in contribution rates and/or decreases in replacement 
rates for example- or indirectly by providing incentives that rewarded more contributions with 
more benefits. Examples of the latter are the extension of the number of contributions 
considered in the calculation of benefits, (which eliminates incentives to under-contribute in the 
early years of working life) and the changes in the rules regarding replacement rates such that 
they penalize early retirement with lower benefits and reward later retirement with higher 
benefits (ECLAC, 2006).    
 
Usually, parametric changes that affected the level and conditions for obtaining benefits 
in the public pillar were implemented in a gradual manner. This was achieved either by applying 
changes over a period of some years by applying them selectively according to age groups of 
the working population (such that the older generations of workers, that have more acquired 
rights under the old systems, are the least affected).  
 
Virtually all reforming countries accompanied structural reforms with parametric 
changes in an attempt to guarantee the sustainability of the public first pillar in the new 
reformed systems as these matured.17 Two examples are discussed in Box 1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 .Examples of parametric changes accompanying structural reforms are summarized in Mesa-Lago (1998) and 
Rodríguez and Duran (2000). 
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Box 1 
Brief description of parametric changes implemented in Argentina and Costa Rica 
In Argentina parametric changes implemented at the time of the structural reform include a 
gradual 5 year increase in the minimum age of retirement (to 60 and 65 years for women and 
men respectively) and an increase in the number of years of contributions required to obtain 
retirement benefits (from 20 to 30 years) (Cetrángolo and Grushka, 2004). The wage 
replacement rate of the public pillar remains virtually the same (before the reform it ranged from 
70% to 82%) but is calculated based on the last ten years of wages instead of the last three.  
 
In Costa Rica, the parametric reform was implemented five years after the structural reform, in 
2005. Contribution rates were left the same for the first five years and then increased gradually 
over a period of 30 years.1 The retirement age was left the same (65 years) but the years of 
contributions required for pensioning were increased from 20 to 25. In terms of wage 
replacement rates from the first pillar, the reform implemented new formulas to calculate them 
so that the rates for higher income people became smaller while those of lower income people 
were left unaltered. The parametric reform had transition rules varying by age group. For 
workers older than 54 contributions and benefits were left unaltered. For those between 45 and 
54 changes take place gradually and for those younger than 45 all changes apply (Martinez 
Franzoni, 2008).  
 
In the case of Costa Rica, estimates are available of the positive effect that the parametric 
reform had on the sustainability of the public PCF system. Before the 2005 reform sustainability 
projections of the system’s balances showed that a first critical moment of would come in 2011 
when contributions would no be enough to finance expenditures and interest earnings of the 
fund would have to be used for this purpose. By 2028 the public pillar fund reserves were 
projected to have run out. With the parametric reform these critical moments are estimated to 
have been postponed by 30 and 26 years respectively. Because the increase in contributions is 
gradual over time there are years in which contributions are insufficient but these balance out in 
the subsequent years. The reform achieved actuarial equilibrium of the public pillar for four 
decades after the reform. 
Source: Based on Cetrángolo and Grushka (2004) and Martinez Franzoni (2008)1. 
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3.1.7 An assessment of the fiscal requirements of the pension system during and 
after reform 
 
The above analysis showed that structural reform of a pension system from a 
PAYGO regime to a system containing individually capitalized accounts entails fiscal 
requirements during and after the transition phase.  These fiscal requirements comprise 
transition costs and other costs.  
 
Regarding transition costs the analysis showed that, although a well designed 
structural pension reform may yield fiscal benefits in the long term, countries should 
carefully estimate the magnitude of the total transition costs that they will be experiencing 
and plan ahead how to finance them. 
 
In relation to the other costs, there may be, in the first place, sizeable fiscal 
requirements arising from assistance pensions and minimum pension guarantees which 
may perpetuate across time. The new systems were believed to have transferred all or 
part of the risk of pension provision from the State to individuals themselves. 
Nevertheless, if the systems end up underperforming in the sense that guarantees for non-
poverty in the old age are insufficient, the State is ultimately the one that ends up 
providing subsistence means for the elderly either through “top ups” to low contributory 
pensions or directly through non-contributory assistance pensions. Hence, ultimately the 
risk of old-age poverty is borne by the State, even when the system has been formally 
completely or partly privatized (Mueller, 2001).  
 
In the second place significant fiscal burdens may arise from subsidies to the 
public pay go pillar, even after the structural reform is implemented. This could happen if 
parametric changes are not implemented within the latter or if they are implemented 
incompletely and fail to match the contribution revenues with the benefit payments in the 
long run.   
 
Lastly, fiscal requirements may stem from subsidies to independent “special” 
schemes if some of these are left out of the consolidation brought about by the reforms. 
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4. Contributory coverage and contribution density 
 
4.1 Contributory coverage 
 
As it was mentioned in section 1.3, one of the main objectives of Latin American 
reforms was to increase the levels of contributory coverage of the pension systems and in 
this way achieve the increase of overall coverage. The extension of social protection 
coverage depends largely on the viability of expanding and formalizing labor markets. 
The diagnosis at the time was that low contributory coverage originated from the lack of 
positive incentives to contribute in a context of large informal sectors providing an easy 
means for contribution evasion. The lack of incentives was believed to be the result of the 
both the lack of trust in the systems and the weak link existing between contributions 
made and benefits received which led agents to perceive the former as a tax on income.  
With this logic in mind, the assumption behind the reforms was that greater transparency 
and efficiency of the system, together with a tighter link between benefits and 
contributions -brought about by the introduction of a defined contribution component 
through individual accounts- would affect incentives of workers encouraging them to 
contribute (Arza, 2008). This would induce the “formalization” of the labor force and 
therefore raise contributory coverage. 
The available evidence shows, however, that reform efforts have not managed to meet 
this goal. Despite the closer correlation between contributions and benefits in countries 
that have undertaken structural reforms, no significant or systematic increases in pension 
coverage rates can be observed (ECLAC, 2006). In fact, the ratio between the number of 
workers actually making contributions in a given period and the economically active 
population (EAP) of the economy does not exhibit a clear trend after the reforms; in some 
countries coverage expanded while in others it decreased even further (figure 1). Existing 
contributory social protection systems cover only a fraction of male and female workers 
with the situation being more complex in rural areas and among workers in the informal 
sector (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Contributory coverage 
Pension system contributors as a percentage of the Economically Active Population 
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Note: Period 0 = Reform period 
Source: Rofman and Lucchetti (2006). For Chile: Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para 
la Reforma Previsional (2006). For Costa Rica: official data. 
  
 
Moreover, the inequalities in coverage -that had been a pervasive element of pension 
systems in Latin America since their inception- remained unchanged after the reforms 
(Arza, 2008). Members of high-income households exhibit systematically higher 
contribution and coverage rates than members of lower income families (Table 3) 
(ECLAC, 2006: Arza, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Contributory coverage by income quintiles18 
(percentage of employed population who makes contributions to a pension scheme) 
 
 
Source: Arza (2008) based on Rofman and Lucchetti (2006). 
 
 
The arguments that have been given to explain the above are mainly twofold and 
are based on the presumption that the possibilities for extending social coverage by 
means of  contributory schemes faces relevant constraints whose removal go beyond the 
possibilities of pension reform itself. In particular these constraints may be posed by the 
limited savings capacity of some population groups together with the instability and 
precariousness of the labor markets in the region (ECLAC, 2006). 
 
In relation to the first constraint, it is argued that contribution evasion may be a 
consequence, not of workers discouraged to contribute because of lack of incentives, but 
of “rational” ones who decide not to contribute because, being poor, they have a high 
discount rate for future consumption (Arza, 2008). In other words, given the basic 
consumption and liquidity needs of vast groups of population in these countries, the 
saving capacity is limited and hence contributory conduct does not react easily to 
incentives.  
 
                                                 
18
 Only Contributory pensions included.  
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
year (lowest) (highest)
Argentina 2004 9.6 31 44.1 53.8 59.3
Bolivia 2002 0.5 2.6 7.5 13.2 30.9
Chile 2003 53.1 62.6 65.8 68.7 72.4
Colombia 1999 11.9 12.9 21.9 33.8 54.4
Costa Rica 2004 50.3 61 64.8 69.5 77.8
Mexico 2002 7.9 25.6 38.9 48.8 57.7
Peru 2003 1.3 4.7 11.6 21.5 37.7
El Salvador 2003 13.2 19.5 31.2 40.1 55.8
Uruguay 2004 25 50.3 62.8 73.2 75.6
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In relation to the second constraint, non-contributive behavior may be an 
inevitable result of volatile economic growth patterns together with labor market patterns. 
In countries that experience large business cycle fluctuations, the labor situation of 
affiliates to the pension system tends to be volatile. Fractions of workers may 
involuntarily move onto unemployment and therefore cease to contribute for some time 
until the situation reverts.  
 
In addition to this cyclical effects, the structure of labor markets in the region 
tends to have a negative impact on contributory social protection through low rates of 
contribution and a close relationship between an individual’s type of labor-market 
participation and his/her contribution (ECLAC, 2006). Contributory coverage clearly 
reflects labor market patterns given that more experienced or more educated workers who 
are in the working in sectors with greater job stability are more likely to pay contributions 
(Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2005). In particular, an analysis by ECLAC (2006) finds that 
wage-earning workers employed in larger enterprises and professionals or technicians are 
more likely to pay contributions than other self-employed workers, workers in micro-
enterprises, unpaid family workers and domestic service workers. Therefore, in countries 
such as most of the Latin American ones, where the proportion of informal sector 
employment -as measured by these last four categories- is high (table 4), it is reasonable 
to find lower rates of contributory coverage of the EAP.19   
 
 
Table 4: Labor Market conditions in Latin America 
(2005 or latest year available) 
 
Latin America 48.5 
Argentina 43.6 
Bolivia 67.1 
Brazil 49.1 
Chile 31.9 
Colombia 58.8 
Costa Rica 39.9 
Ecuador  57.8 
El Salvador 56 
Mexico 42.6 
Nicaragua 58.8 
Panama 37.6 
Paraguay 61.3 
Peru 54.9 
Dominican Republic 49 
Uruguay 44.6 
Venezuela 50 
Informal Sector Employment as a %  
of Total Urban Employment 
 
 
Source: ILO (International Labour Organization) Labour Overview (2006) 
 
Note: Informal sector employment is composed by workers in micro-enterprises (enterprises with up to 5 
employees), self-employed workers (excluding administrative, professionals and technicians), unpaid 
independent workers and domestic service workers.  
 
                                                 
19
 ILO (International Labor Organization) defines informal sector employment as that in the four 
categories mentioned. 
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4.2 Contribution Density  
 
The formalization of the labor market is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
guarantee the adequate insurance of the population against old-age poverty. To analyze 
this issue the concept of density of contributions must be brought into the discussion. 
This one is normally used to measure the frequency of a person’s contribution throughout 
his/her working life and is calculated as the number of contributions made divided by the 
number of months in which the individual was of working age (ECLAC, 2006). 
The concept of density is useful since in the reformed systems, the probability of securing 
adequate retirement benefits depends critically on accumulating sufficient savings in the 
individual accounts and this is only achieved through regular contributions.20 Since the 
pension received depends directly on the (indexed) sum of all contributions made into the 
individual account people with significant contribution gaps (periods in which they did 
not contribute) are likely to accumulate insufficient balances and receive pensions that 
are low or time-limited (ECLAC, 2006).21 The same is true for workers with a late start in 
their contribution history, since contributions at the first working ages are compounded 
for a longer period and are therefore the most relevant.  
 
Average densities estimated for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay since the reform 
date onwards are 49%, 52.4% and 60,8% and respectively (Fajnzylber and Repetto, 
2008). Contribution densities allow estimating, for individuals reaching their retirement 
age, the probability of having complied with the regulatory minimum years of 
contributions and/or of having accumulated enough savings in their account.  
 
For Argentina, estimates by ILO (2005), indicated that almost half the people over 
50 years of age as of 2001 had densities so low that they would not be in a position to 
pension when reaching the minimum statutory age, even if from that year onwards they 
were to contribute in a continuous manner until the legal retirement age.  
For Chile, where there is no requirement in terms of minimum years of contributions, 
projections regarding the level of pensions to be earned by affiliates indicated that around 
half of the affiliates to the individual accounts system pensioning between 2005 and 2025 
would have densities too low to finance a pension higher than the statutory minimum and 
also too low to qualify for the Minimum Guaranteed Pension (Bernstein et al., 2005).  
 
For the Uruguayan case, projections in Bucheli et al. (2005) based on contribution 
history of workers for the period 1996-2004, indicated that only 13% of workers would 
achieve the 35 years of contributions required at 60 years of age and 28% would achieve 
them at 65 years of age.22 
 
                                                 
20
 In a PAYGO system on the other hand, individuals complying with the required number of contributions 
receive a defined-benefit pension (ECLAC, 2006). 
21
 Whereas PAYGO systems pay benefits according to a defined benefit formula and pool the risk of 
worker’s “blank periods” and periods of low earnings over the covered population, the reformed systems 
shift all or part of the burden of these risks onto the individual (Packard, 2001). 
22
 When considering only the pre-crisis period for the projections (1996-1998), the percentages increase to 
24% and 42% respectively. 
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The main conclusion to be drawn from the above is that not only coverage has not 
increased, but also even in countries where it is highest as measured by the indicator of 
contributors in relation to the economically active population, a large proportion of such 
contributors are in effect under-insured. This means that their contribution densities are 
below the threshold needed to qualify for a retirement pension in defined-benefit models 
or result in lower quality pensions in funded systems (ECLAC, 2006).  
 
It is not a casual fact that the three countries mentioned above have had recently 
to introduce changes to their systems (Argentina in 2005-2007; Chile and Uruguay in 
2008) in order to palliate the above problems of insufficient and inadequate insurance 
against old age poverty. This is discussed below. 
 
4.3 Recent Reforms to address insufficiency of adequate coverage  
 
It was mentioned that country studies for Argentina, Chile and Uruguay indicated 
that, among the affiliates to the pension system, a large proportion of individuals were in 
effect under-insured as a result of their very low contribution densities. This meant that 
they would either not qualify for a pension when reaching retirement age (in the cases of 
Argentina and Uruguay) or not be able to finance a pension higher than the statutory 
minimum from their individual accounts (in the case of Chile). The three countries have 
recently had, to a certain extent, to acknowledge this reality and implement changes to 
alleviate the situation. Next we briefly discuss the measures they implemented.  
  
4.3.1 Argentina 
 
In 2005-2007, the Argentine Government implemented a number of measures to 
deal with the problems of inadequate coverage of  the pension system. One of the main 
ones was the implementation of successive “Moratorias Previsionales” that basically 
implied giving the possibility of acquiring a pension to people with the regulatory age for 
pensioning but not complying with the minimum required number of contributions 
(Cetrángolo y Grushka 2008).  Beneficiaries have to cancel the missing contributing 
years in a fixed amount of payments to be deducted from the pension benefits they 
acquire. “Moratorias” have benefited around 1.3 million people (3.2% of the total 
population) and increased the proportion of population over 65 receiving a pension to 
more than 80% in 2007 from a level of 70% in the decade of the 90’s (Castiñeira, 2007; 
Cetrángolo y Grushka 2008).23  
A second measure implemented was a “bail-out” of all affiliates near the pensioning age 
(less than 10 years away) that, having chosen the individual account option for their 
second pillar, had accumulated insufficient funds to obtain a pension at least equal to the 
one paid by the PAYGO sub-system.  They were allowed to change onto the latter and 
will therefore be able to retire with the benefits from the public system (provided they 
have contributed the statutory 30 years). This measure benefited around 1.2 million 
workers and it is a demonstration of how, although in the Argentine case the State did not 
                                                 
23
 Moratorias have existed in Argentina for decades and although they have repeatedly provided a 
“solution” to coverage issues, they nevertheless provide an improvised solution and individuals do not have 
certainty on whether they will end up covered by a moratoria or not.   
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formally provide a Minimum Pension Guarantee for the individual account pillar, in 
practice it ended up having to “bail out” affiliates with insufficient funds accumulated 
just as if the guarantee had been in place. 
The net fiscal cost of both these measures together has been estimated at about 0.84% of 
GDP in 2007 and 0.54% of GDP in 2008 (Castiñeira, 2007).24  
 
4.3.2 Chile 
 
In Chile, before January 2008 there existed a non–contributory “assistance 
pension” (“PASIS”) for indigent elderly who did not qualify for a contributory pension 
(for example for not complying with the required number of years of contributions). 
Nevertheless, the Government limited the amount of PASIS given out in order to control 
fiscal costs and therefore many people did not receive this coverage although qualifying 
for it.  
 
On the other hand, a Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG) from the Government 
was in place for those retirees that had insufficient funds accumulated in their individual 
accounts to retire with a pension higher than the statutory minimum. But to qualify for 
this guarantee workers needed to have at least 20 years of contributions and, as it was 
mentioned, projections showed that this requisite would leave about half of the affiliates 
without the guarantee even when their projected pension level was below the statutory 
minimum pension.  
 
In an attempt to solve these inadequate coverage issues, a reform was 
implemented in January 2008. It eliminated both the PASIS and MPG and substituted 
them for a non-contributory Basic Pension (BP) financed from general tax revenue and 
available to all pensioners with incomes in the lowest 60% of the population.  Of these, 
all who do not have a self-financed pension will receive the whole value of the BP 
equivalent to around US$ 140. Those who do have some amount of self –financed 
pension will nevertheless receive a supplement, but the amount of this benefit decreases 
inversely with the amount that they were capable to finance with their own means. The 
supplement reaches zero when the self-financed portion is at about US$ 460 per month.25 
(BBVA Pensions Observatory, 2008; IADB news, 2008). 
 
In addition to this, other measures were implemented to increase the density of 
contributions of the segments of workers among which it is lowest. For example, the 
reform intends to gradually integrate the self-employed workers into the contributory 
system. At first they will only contribute for a portion of their earnings but by 2015 
contributions to the individual account system will be compulsory for them for their 
whole income. Also given the importance of contributions at early stages of working life 
some incentives were put in place for the hiring of young workers.    
                                                 
24
 The gross expenditure on pensions for beneficiaries of the measures is higher at 1.3% and 1.5% of GDP 
in 2007 and 2008 respectively but as the measures increase the contributions received by the PAYGO 
system the net fiscal cost is thus lower (Castiñeira, 2007).   
25
 The exchange rate used for these figures was 1US$=CH$550. 
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With the measures proposed estimates are that the average contribution density could be 
increased by around ten percentage points in a period of five to ten years (Asher and 
Vasudevan, 2008).  
The cost of fully implementing the 2008 reform has been estimated at 0.9% to 1% of 
GDP annually. 
 
4.3.3 Uruguay 
 
A law was recently sanctioned that reduces the required number of years of 
contributions to retire (to the pre-parametric reform level of 30 years) in view of the fact 
that a large proportion of affiliates did not comply with such minimum when reaching the 
legal retirement age.  
 
4.4 An assessment of contributory coverage and contribution density 
 
By supposedly increasing contributory coverage, the Latin American structural reforms 
were intended to make the non-contributory pillar less relevant. Not only coverage has 
not increased, but also, even in countries where it is highest, density estimations show 
that even the “covered” among the labor force are in fact underinsured in the sense that 
they are NOT accumulating rights towards adequate retirement benefits.  
This reality has, to a certain extent, been acknowledged by the new changes that some 
reforming countries have recently implemented. 
 
 
5. Issues in the Latin American experience in pension reform and their 
implications for the Chinese case 
 
The Latin American experience and history in pension reform is not unique to the 
region. Countries of other regions of the developing world, affected by the same 
problems and prompted by the same concerns (fiscal unsustainability and low coverage) 
as those pertaining to Latin America, have opted to undertake a similar path in pension 
reform. Such is the case of China, which following several unsuccessful attempts, 
replaced its PAYGO system in 1997, with a mixed pension system consisting of three 
pillars.   
 
Pillar I consists of a social pooling pillar (public benefit) and a fully funded 
individual account. The objective of the social pooling pillar is to ensure a minimum 
standard of living above the poverty line for all old people. It is financed on a pay-as-
you-go-basis. Pillar II consists of a contribution which is voluntary and financed either by 
the employer and/or employee. Finally, Pillar III is an individual account financed from 
voluntary contributions by employees. (A more detailed description of the current system 
is provided in the Annex). 
 
In spite of more than one decade since the reform was implemented, many of the 
problems that plagued the PAYGO system remain unresolved.  
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The analysis of the pension reform outcomes in Latin America in terms of 
coverage, fiscal performance can provide useful insights for the Chinese case since both 
cases share important similarities.  
 
For one thing, as with Latin America, the existence of structural constraints in 
China, such as its high degree of labor market informality, represent a significant obstacle 
to the success of the pension reform in terms of coverage. In both cases, the formalization 
of the labor market is a prerequisite for pension reform success. In the case of China, 
labor market precariousness is magnified by the sheer size of its rural population and the 
growing migration flows from rural to urban areas. 
 
5.1 Issues regarding the expansion of (quality) coverage  
 
Achieving a larger coverage rate of the pension system is still a major challenge 
in China. In the first place, the voluntary pension insurance scheme in place for rural 
workers –which constitute the majority of employment at 63%- has a coverage rate of 
only 10.9%. The system in place for urban workers -the one on which the reform process 
concentrated- achieved a coverage rate of 50% in 2006, up from 41.7% in 1997.26 
Despite this increase, it is not clear that relying only on a reform strategy centered on the 
contributory scheme is enough in order to guarantee the adequate insurance of the old age 
population. The Latin American experiences have shown that there may be structural 
limits to the possibilities for extending old age insurance by means of contributory 
schemes and it is worth considering if these same limits might be present in China. 
Recall the logic behind the reforms introducing a fully funded component: a tighter link 
between benefits and contributions -introduced through an individual capitalization 
account - will affect positively the incentives of workers to contribute, thus inducing the 
“formalization” of the labor force and therefore raising contributory coverage (see section 
1).  
 
In the Chinese case, the lack of positive incentives seems to be still in place; the 
link between contributions and future benefits remains diffuse as a result of “empty 
accounts” (see Annex 1). But even if these problems are corrected and positive incentives 
on contributions indeed become important, there still may be structural barriers 
preventing contributions from reacting to these incentives.  
 
The structure of labor markets and the close relationship between an individual’s 
type of labor-market participation and his/her contributory conduct proved to be a key 
constraint to the possibility of expanding contributory coverage in Latin America. In 
China, informal sector employment accounts for almost half of total urban employment 
and is the fastest growing segment of the urban labor market (Jütting and Xenogiani, 
2007). With rural migration to cities on the rise –the annual increase in the number of 
rural migrants averaged 15% from 1998 to 2004- it is not difficult to speculate that 
pressures on the labor market may lead to even larger informality (Jütting and Xenogiani, 
2007).  
                                                 
26
 Figures correspond to 2006 calculated from China Statistical Yearbook (2007). The coverage rate of 50% 
is calculated as the number of urban contributors to the pension system over the total urban employment. 
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Besides, even if a fraction of informal workers moves at some time to formal 
employment and becomes affiliate to the pension system, this might not guarantee their 
adequate insurance against old-age poverty. The Latin American experience showed that 
people that join the formal labor force lately, or intermittently, achieve low contribution 
densities. Moreover, since contributions at the early working ages are the most relevant 
(they are compounded for a longer period than late contributions) individuals with a late 
start in their contribution history will probably accumulate low levels of savings in their 
individual accounts. So in practice, as it happened in the Latin American experiences 
revised, even among affiliates to the contributory system, a proportion of them may end 
up inadequately insured in the old age.  
Some of them are likely to either not be able to comply with the minimum number of 
contributions required to qualify for a contributory pension and/or accumulate 
insufficient funds in their individual accounts to guarantee them an adequate pension 
level.  
 
In the Latin American experiences, another barrier to the expansion of 
contributory was the low savings capacity of the population. This however does not 
appear to be the case in the Chinese experience since Chinese families’ savings rates are 
comparatively very high, even in relation to developed countries. Household savings in 
percent of GDP are at 16% in China, compared to 10.8% in France, 8.2% in Japan, 4.5% 
in Korea and 4.8% in the United States. In terms of households’ disposable income, the 
saving rate has risen from about 5% before 1978 to around 25% in 2004 with the figure is 
slightly higher for rural households than for urban ones (Kuijs, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Issues regarding the fiscal requirements of the pension system during and after 
reform 
 
5.2.1. Transition cost 
 
In the Chinese mixed reform there was no recognition of past contributions to the 
old system because the public system (“social pool”) is itself the first tier of the new 
mixed system and pays benefits to all retirees (see Annex ). Therefore the transition cost 
in the Chinese case is given only by the operating deficit of the public system.   
 
Here, the same as in Costa Rica, there was no actual deviation of contributions to 
fund the individual accounts because these are funded from employee contributions 
which were put in place with the reforms and not diverted from the social pool. The 
difference is that in Costa Rica revenues of the public system are enough to pay for its 
pension expenditures (and the parametric reform implemented ensured that this was the 
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case for a longer time). In China on the contrary, there is a transition period until the 
system matures, in which revenues fall well below expenditures.  
 
The social pool continues paying pensions to the “old men” according to the old 
generous benefit rules (an average replacement rate of 80%) and it also has to pay 
transition pensions to “middle men” to make up for the years during which they were not 
contributing to the individual accounts (see Annex 1). As a consequence, the operating 
deficit that emerges has to be covered by fiscal transfers.27  As the system matures, and 
no “old men” and “middle men” remain, these obligations will disappear and the social 
pool will only be paying first tier benefits to all retirees according to the new rules. Only 
then will the average replacement rate paid by the public tier have converged to the new 
lower target level set by the reforms.  
 
The magnitude of the Chinese transition cost will basically depend on how long 
the transition period will be, this is for how long will the old and new system will coexist. 
Some estimates suggest that that the transition period will not be completed until 2030 
and only by that time will the new program be completely built in (Chen, 2004). 
 
 
5.2.2. Other fiscal costs 
 
By supposedly inducing the formalization of the labor market and increasing 
contributory coverage, structural reforms introducing a funded component are intended to 
reduce the need for public expenditure on non-contributory assistance pensions and 
minimum pension guarantees. Nevertheless the Latin American experiences analyzed 
showed that this is not necessarily the case. Labor market issues leading to low 
contribution densities may leave a vast proportion of affiliates inadequately covered by 
the contributory pillar and therefore fiscal requirements from the non-contributory pillar 
will continue after the reform, compounding the budgetary pressures arising from 
transition costs. 
 
For the reasons discussed in section 4.2 above, it could be a possibility that some 
affiliates to the contributory system end up with densities too low to comply with the 
regulatory minimum years of contributions. The fiscal requirements stemming from non-
                                                 
27
 Although the gap is not evident when looking at the overall balance of the basic pension system -this one 
exhibits an overall surplus over the years as reported in Salditt et al (2007)- it has to be borne in mind that 
the revenue side of the figure not only includes contribution revenue but also income from Government 
budget allocations and subsidies as well as other sources (China Statistical Yearbook 2007 explanatory 
notes). The existence of a financial gap is therefore given implicitly by the need for these extra transfers to 
some local pension pools that run deficits and cannot cover their pension obligations. Government 
subsidies stood at 0.2% of GDP in 2000 while in 2007 they had increased to 0.5% of GDP (Ma and Zhai, 
2001; National Bureau of Statistics). Moreover, the accumulation of empty individual accounts in a large 
number of provinces also reflected the insufficiency of contributions to cover expenditures of some social 
pools and hence the utilization of individual account balances to help close these gaps.  
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contributory social assistance pensions for all of them should be put into the fiscal 
equation. 
  
For individuals managing to comply with the required number of contributions, it 
may be the case that a late contribution start or an intermittent contributory history causes 
the funds accumulated in their individual account to be too low to guarantee them the 
replacement rate expected by the reform (see Annex). The Chinese Government could 
end up having to “top-up” their pensions in order to guarantee them a minimum standard 
of living. Minimum pension guarantees for retirees of the contributory system, either 
explicit as in the Chilean case, or ex-post as in the Argentine one, should be 
acknowledged as another contingent Government liability under the Chinese reformed 
system. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
` Pension systems generally comprise contributory and non-contributory schemes. 
Pension reform in Latin America was centered mainly on the contributory system and 
incorporated a fully funded component of saving inside individual accounts. This was 
premised on the belief that positive incentives resulting from a tighter link between 
contributions and benefits would i) bring about the formalization of the labor market 
therefore increasing contributory coverage ii) reduce (in the long term) the fiscal 
requirements stemming from the reformed system by shifting the economic and financial 
risks of pension provision –totally or in part- from the State to the workers themselves. 
   
Nevertheless the limited savings capacity of the population together with the 
precarious labor markets in the region severely limited the potential for success of this 
strategy.  
 
In the first place, in spite of the reforms, to this day, a large proportion of the 
population remains inadequately covered by the contributory system. This showed that 
focusing the reform strategies solely on the contributory element is insufficient to 
guarantee the adequate coverage of the population in the old-age. In fact, the analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the non-contributory element is an essential part of any 
pension system and it must be contemplated in any reform strategy that seeks to provide 
universal coverage. In fact, the analysis shows that market driven incentives by 
themselves cannot solve the pension problem unless complemented by a non-market 
solidarity component. 
 
In the second place, the performance in terms of fiscal requirements was worse 
than expected. Transition costs proved to be large and long lasting. These costs were in 
turn compounded by increasing budgetary pressures stemming from the solidarity 
component as a result of the failure of the reforms to increase coverage by means of the 
contributory scheme.  
 
These conclusions are relevant for a country like China whose labor markets have 
an important share of informality, with a large rural population migrating to cities, and an 
absence of a history of clearly defined market incentive systems. These labor market 
issues leading to low contribution densities may leave a vast proportion of affiliates 
inadequately covered by the contributory pillar and therefore fiscal requirements from the 
non-contributory pillar will continue after the reform, compounding the budgetary 
pressures arising from transition costs. 
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Annex: Brief description of the Chinese pension reform 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three types of government sponsored pension systems 
currently operating in China – a) The Enterprise Old Age Insurance program, a 
mandatory system applicable to all kinds of urban enterprises and their employees as 
well as individual workers in urban areas, b) a voluntary pension insurance system for 
rural workers and c) special occupational schemes for civil servants and employees of 
state organizations and institutions (Sin, 2005). 
 
The Chinese pension reform process started in the mid 80’s and it was centered in 
the system in place for urban workers.28 It was in 1997 that the system was revised to 
what constitutes the basis of the current scheme: a mixed system comprising a 
compulsory first pillar and two voluntary pillars of saving in individual accounts (Salditt 
et al, 2007) 29.    
 
The mixed character of the scheme is given by the mandatory first pillar since this 
one combines a public “social pool” designed to work on a PAYGO basis with a fully 
funded component of individually capitalized accounts.   
 
The PAYGO social pool ensures a flat replacement rate of 20% of local average 
wage (provided the worker has at least 15 years of contributions) plus an extra 0.6% for 
each additional year contributed until 30% is reached (World Bank, 2006; Chen, 2004 
and Sin 2005).30  The individual account has a target replacement rate of 24.2% based on 
the assumption of 15 years of continuing contribution (Salditt et al, 2007).31 Employee 
contributions –which exist only since the reform process put them in place in 1991- fund 
these individual accounts (Chen, 2004).  
 
In practice however, the funded nature of the individual accounts has not been 
respected in all cases and some individual accounts became “notional” in the sense of 
“empty”. This happened as a result of individual savings being applied to pay existing 
pensioners when contributions were insufficient for this purpose. Since contributions to 
the social pool and to the individual account were deposited in the same government bank 
accounts, local governments routinely “borrowed” individual account contributions to 
cover cash shortfalls in social pools (Wang, 2006). In 2000 a State Council document 
mandated the separate administration of accounts and moreover, since 2006, the 
Government has been making contributions to individual accounts in some provinces in 
                                                 
28
 Urban workers currently represent 37% of total employment. 
29
 Underlying the pension system is the National Social Security Fund, established in 2000,as a long -term 
strategic reserve for future social security expenditures. This fund is managed by a public agency -the 
National Council for Social Security Funds- and is accumulated through budget allocations and sale of 
state-owned shares, among other sources (Salditt et al, 2007). 
30
 A State Council document of 2006 has changed the factor of 0.6% to 1% of the ratio of own wage to 
average wage (Sin, 2006). 
31
 The factor of 120 is based on an assumed average post-retirement lifetime of 120 months but when a 
pensioner lives longer the benefits continue to be paid at the same rate out of the social pool. It has proved 
to be underestimated and therefore some pilot projects have had it adjusted in order to bring it in line with 
average local lifetime expectancies at retirement (Salditt et al 2008).   
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order to “backfill” them and give them back their fully funded attribute (OECD China 
country profile, 2007).    
 
In the Chinese case, “old men” were not affected by the reform and remained 
entitled to benefits as determined by the old system (an average replacement rate of 80% 
paid by the public social pool).  For “new men”, the new mixed system was compulsory 
and so their benefits are determined according to the new rules discussed above. Finally 
for “middle men” the new mixed system was also compulsory but their benefits will be a 
mixture of the new and old systems. They will receive the same two components as the 
“new men” and on top of that a “transition pension” paid by the social pool. As “middle 
men” have less years ahead of contributions into their individual accounts than “new 
men”, the transition pension makes up for the years during which they did not contribute 
to the individual account.32 In practice, the effective replacement rate for the “middle 
men” is estimated to be similar to that of “new men”, around 60 % or higher.33 
                                                 
32
 The transition pension is calculated as 1.72% of the average wage in the final working year for each year 
of service before the reform date (1997) (Chen, 2004). 
33
 See studies reviewed in Dunaway and Arora (2007).  
 34 
 
References 
 
Acuña, R.R. &  Iglesias, A.P. (2000) La Reforma a las Pensiones en Larraín, F. & 
Vergara, R. (2000) eds. La transformación Económica de Chile. Santiago: Centro de 
Estudios Públicos. Pp.431-490. 
 
AIOS (International Association of Pension Funds’ Supervisory Organisations), 
http://www.aiosfp.org/ 
 
Arenas de Mesa, Alberto, et al. (2006), “The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: 
Lessons from the Social Protection Survey”, Pension Research Council Working Paper 
2006-9 , Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Arza, Camila (2008), Pension reform in Latin America: Distributional principles, 
inequalities and alternative policy options. Journal of Latin American Studies, Volume 
40, Issue 1, pp. 1–28. 
 
Asher, Mukul and Deepa Vasudevan, (2008), “Rethinking Pension Reforms in Chile: 
Implications for Developing Asia”, available in:  
http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/wp/2008/wp0807.pdf 
 
BBVA Pensions Observatory (2008), “Ajustes al sistema de pensiones chileno”, available 
in: 
http://serviciodeestudios.bbva.com/TLBB/fbin/ETEND_080331_pensionsobservatory_02
_tcm268-163171.pdf 
 
Berstein Solange, Larrain Guillermo and Francisco Pino (2005), “Cobertura, densidad y 
pensiones en Chile: Proyecciones a 20 años plazo”, Document No. 12 of Series 
Documentos de Trabajo, Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones 
de Chile. 
 
Bucheli, Marisa, Forteza, Alvaro, Rossi, I. and Natalia Ferreira-Coimbra, (2005), “El 
acceso a la jubilación o pensión en Uruguay: ¿cuántos y quiénes lo lograrían?”, ECLAC  
Montevideo and CEPAL/GTZ project “Desarrollo y equidad social en América Latina y 
el Caribe”. 
 
Castiñeira, Ramiro, (2007), “El Impacto Fiscal de la Reforma Previsional”. Special 
Report No. 376, August 2007, Econométrica S.A. http://www.econometrica.com.ar/ 
 
Cetrángolo, O. and Carlos Grushka (2008), “Perspectivas previsionales en Argentina y su 
financiamiento tras la expansion de la cobertura”, Financiamiento del desarrollo series, 
No. XX, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). 
 
 35 
Cetrángolo, O. and Carlos Grushka (2004), “Sistema previsional argentino: crisis, 
reforma y crisis de la reforma”, Financiamiento del desarrollo series, No. 151 
(LC/L.2219-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), December. 
 
Chen, Vivian Y., (2004), “A Macro Analysis of China Pension Pooling System Incentive 
Issues and Financial Problem”, International Conference on Pensions in Asia: Incentives, 
Compliance and Their Role in Retirement. Available in: 
http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/pie/Japanese/discussionpaper/dp2003/dp195/text.pdf 
 
 
China Statistical Yearbook (2007), data available in: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Cuenta de Inversión, Contaduría General de la Nación, Argentina, Ministry of Economy 
and Production. (various years). Available in: 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda/cgn/cuenta/ 
 
Dunaway, Steve and Vivek Arora, (2007), “Pension Reform in China: The Need for a 
New Approach”, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper, WP/07/109. 
Washington DC. 
 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean),  (2006),  
“Shaping the Future of Social Protection: Access, Financing and Solidarity”. Santiago, 
Chile. Available in: http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/24080/lcg2294i.pdf 
 
Fajnzylber, Eduardo and Andrea Repetto, (2008),  “Instrumentos Alternativos para la 
Protección Social”, mimeo. 
 
Ferreira-Coimbra, Natalia and Alvaro Forteza, (2005). "Can Latin America Protect the 
Elderly with Non-Contributory Programmes? The Case of Uruguay," Development 
Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 23(6), pages 683-702, November. 
 
Gill, Indermit, Packard, Truman, and Juan Yermo, (2005), “ Keeping the promise of old 
age income security in Latin America”, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
IADB News (26th February 2008), available in: 
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/detail.cfm?language=English&id=4433 
 
 
ILO (International Labour Organization) Labour Overview, (2006), available in: 
http://www.oit.org.pe/WDMS/bib/publ/panorama/labour_overview_06.pdf 
 
ILO (International Labor Organization) (2005), “Protección social en Argentina: 
financiamiento, cobertura y desempeño, 1990-2003”, Fabio M. Bertranou y Damián 
Bonari (coords.), ILO, Santiago, Chile. 
 36 
 
Informe de Diagnóstico para el Consejo Asesor para la Reforma Previsional, (2006), 
available in: http://www.consejoreformaprevisional.cl/documentos/tema-6-compromisos-
fiscales.pdf 
 
Jütting, Johannes and Theodora Xenogiani (2007), “Informal Employment and Internal 
Migration: The case of China”, OECD Presentation, available in: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/54/39883049.ppt 
 
Kuijs, Louis, (2006), “How Will China's Saving-Investment Balance Evolve?. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3958.  
 
Larraín, F. & Vergara, R. (2000) eds. La transformación Económica de Chile. Santiago: 
Centro de Estudios Públicos. 
 
Ma, Jun and Fan Zhai,  (2001), “Financing China’s Pension Reform”  
presented at the Conference on Financial Sector Reform in China, September 11-13, 2001 
available in: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/Conferences/financial_sector/FinancingChinasPensionReform.pdf 
 
Martinez Franzoni, Juliana, (2008), “ Costa Rica’s Pension Reform: A Decade of 
Negotiated Incremental Change”, in Lessons from Pension Reforms in the Americas, 
edited by Stephen J. Kay and Tapen Sinha, Oxford University Press. 
 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (2004), “Evaluación de un cuarto de siglo de reformas 
estructurales de pensiones en América Latina”. ECLAC Review No. 84  (December), 
ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 
 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo  (2004a), “Las reformas de pensiones en América Latina y su 
impacto en los principios de la seguridad social”, Financiamiento del desarrollo series, 
No. 144 (LC/L.2090-P/E), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
 
 
 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo  (2002a), “Models of Development, Social Policy and Reform in 
Latin America”, document prepared for the United Nations Research Institute  for Social 
Development (UNRISD) project on Social Policy in a Development Context, UNRISD, 
Geneva. 
 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo  (2002b), “Reassessing Pension Reform in Chile and Other 
Countries in Latin America”, University of Pittsburgh, available in:  
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2002/SocialProtection/lago_paper.pdf 
 
 37 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo  (2000), “Estudio comparativo de los costos fiscales en la transición 
de ocho reformas de pensiones en América Latina”, Financiamiento del desarrollo 
series, No. 93 (LC/L.1344-P/E), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), March. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
S.00.II.G.29. 
 
Mesa-Lago Carmelo, (1998): “La reforma estructural de pensiones en América Latina: 
tipología, comprobación de supuestos y enseñanzas”. In Pensiones en América Latina: 
dos décadas de reformas. ILO (International Labor Organization) , Lima, 1998.  
 
Mueller, Katherine, (2001), Public-Private Interaction in the Structural Pension Reform 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, report for the OECD Insurance and Private 
Pensions Compendium, available in: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/6/1816289.doc 
 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), China, “Statistical Communiqué on Labor and 
Social Security Undertakings in 2007”,. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
 
OECD China Country Profile, (2007), available in: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/46/38766497.pdf 
Packard, Truman G., (2001), “Is There a Positive Incentive Effect from Privatizing Social 
Security? Evidence from Latin America”, World Bank Working Paper Nº 2719. 
Queisser, Monika (1998) “The Second-Generation Pension Reforms in Latin America”, 
OECD Ageing Working Paper (AWP) 5.4, available in:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/39/2429287.pdf 
 
Rodríguez Herrera, Adolfo and Fabio Durán Valverde, (2000), “Los Costos de la 
Transición en un Régimen de Beneficio Definido”, Financiamiento del desarrollo series, 
No. 100, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). 
 
Rofman, Rafael and Leonardo Lucchetti, (2006), “Pension systems in Latin America: 
Concepts and measurements of Coverage”, World Bank, Social Protection Discussion 
Papers Nro. 0616, Washington, DC. 
 
Rofman, Rafael, (2004), “The Economic Crisis in Argentina and its Impacts on the 
Pension System”, available in: http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/IFM-Rofman-Pension-WP-
2004-E.pdf 
 
Salditt, Felix, Whiteford, Peter and Willem Adema, (2008), “Pension reform in China”, 
International Social Security Review, Volume 61, Number 3, July/September 2008 , pp. 
47-71(25). 
 
Salditt, Felix, Whiteford, Peter and Willem Adema (2007) “Pension Reform in China: 
Progress and Prospects” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 
53. 
 38 
 
Sin, Yvonne (2006), “Evolution of pension reforms in China”, Powerpoint presentation, 
available in: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPENSIONS/Resources/395443-
1142535808399/2329423-1153494626907/Sin_ChinaPensionReforms.pdf 
 
Sin, Yvonne., 2005, “China: Pension Liabilities and Reform Options for Old Age 
Insurance,” Working Paper No. 2005–1, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Uthoff, Andras. 2001. "La reforma del sistema de pensiones en Chile: desafíos 
pendientes." Financiamiento del desarrollo series, No. 112. Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
 
Wang, Dewen, (2006), “China's Urban and Rural Old Age Security System: Challenges 
and Options” China & World Economy, Volume 14, Number 1, February 2006 , pp. 102-
116(15) 
 
World Bank, 2006, China: Evaluation of the Liaoning Social Security Reform Pilot, 
Report No. 38183-CN, December. 
 
Zviniene, Asta and Truman G. Packard, (2004), “A Simulation Of Social Security 
Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Gained?”, Background paper for regional 
study on social security reform, Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and 
Caribbean region, The World Bank, Washington. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
